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Highlights
At the 8th Florence Rail Forum regulators, operators and network 
managers came together to discuss investments in railway infrastructure 
and rolling stock. In light of frequently pointed out investment backlogs 
in the rail sector the central question was how regulation on the 
European and national level can provide the necessary incentives for 
more investment.
Investments in rail infrastructure and rolling stock require clear, stable 
and predictable rules because of their very long-term nature.
With the 4th Railway package there are several proposals to improve 
conditions for investments such as strengthening the role of the 
infrastructure manager to allow a more sustainable investment planning 
and harmonizing technical standards to improve interoperability. The 
European Union also plays an increasingly important role in investment 
financing through Regional Funds, the Connecting Europe Facility and 
the shift2rail initiative. 
There are however different views among the stakeholders in the rail 
sector on the right strategy and right priorities on the European level 
which were discussed at the Forum. 
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Financing railways: what role for 
regulation?
A comment by MATTHIAS FINGER | FSR-Transport Director
It is common knowledge that railways require substantial financing… 
traditionally, such financing has come from the national and regional 
public sector, but, in the context of the crisis of public finances, railways 
increasingly also look for innovative financing models such as the EU funds 
(either through the new Connecting Europe Facility and through regional 
funds), new involvement of national and supra-national banks (i.e., European 
Investment Bank), and greater contributions from the private sector. It is 
especially in this situation where regulatory policies and regulatory conditions 
are becoming paramount. This was the topic of the last Florence Rail Forum. 
Three considerations seem to me to be important in this respect: 
•	 the need for a stable and coherent regulatory environment,
•	 the European Commission’s philosophy on infrastructure financing, and 
•	 the European Commission’s vision on service financing.
Regulatory economics clearly states that a stable regulatory environment is 
key, namely because of the long-term nature and asset specificity of investments 
in infrastructures in general and in railway infrastructures in particular. In 
addition, the literature is clear about the fact that one also needs a coherent 
regulatory environment, notably when it comes to critical technical functions 
that affect the entire infrastructure system, such as interconnection and 
interoperability standards. But coherence is also important between national 
regulatory policies and supra-national (European) ones. In the railway sector, 
particular attention must also be paid to the alignment of incentives between 
infrastructure and services, both in terms of system boundaries (international, 
national and regional transport) as well as in terms of the relevant time 
period (e.g., investments into the tracks and investment into rolling stock). 
Finally, in order to strengthen fair competition, attention has to be paid to 
the alignment of incentives between the different involved actors, such as the 
public authorities, the investors, the operators and the manufacturers.
The policy or rather the philosophy of the European Commission in 
matters of network industries’ financing is quite clear and straightforward, 
based as it is on resolute unbundling (vertical disintegration): on the one 
hand, there is the network infrastructure (railway tracks, electricity grid, 
gas grid, telecommunications grid, etc.) whose financing can be public or 
private. Subsidies are generally allowed for the development of particularly 
onerous network infrastructure elements. Cross-subsidies and distortion of 
competition is not considered to be a problem because of the (theoretically) 
clean ownership unbundling. In the railway sector, it is clearly admitted that 
financing of the infrastructure comes from the public sector. Ideally, there 
is a distinction to be made between the financing of the development of the 
tracks (which clearly depends on public financing) and the operations of the 
infrastructure, which should be financed by track access charges, but which 
can also be subsidized by the public sector. 
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On the other hand, there are the services (e.g., energy services, transport 
services, communication services), which, ideally, should be financed purely 
commercially. This, in theory, should not be a problem because the costs of 
the infrastructure has already been separated out. In the railway sector, things 
are a little bit more complicated, yet can still be conceptualized clearly by 
way of a distinction between commercial railway services (e.g., long-distance 
passenger services, high-speed rail services, cargo services) on the one hand, 
and services under public service obligations (PSO) on the other hand. 
The former – i.e., both rolling stock and operations – should be financed 
commercially, while the latter – again both rolling stock and operations – can 
be subsidized. This to the point that rolling stock may even be owned by the 
PSO authorities.
So, on paper, all is well, and it seems possible to apply the general considerations 
that are valid for financing other network industries to the railway sector as 
well. Financing will be provided by the public sector for the infrastructure 
and for the PSOs, whereas the market will provide the financing for the 
rest. Because of clear unbundling there are also no market distortion issues, 
even though there may be market dominance issues. Regulation, however, is 
needed in matters of access to the infrastructure, pricing of the infrastructure, 
interoperability, interconnection, and scarce capacity management. Regulation 
is assumed to be strong and stable, so that this will not be a problem either. 
Our Florence Rail Forum, however, discussed the reality of investments, 
and this reality relates to regulatory policy and regulation. Three problems 
appeared particularly striking:
•	 There is first the problem that regulation is not strong and stable, 
resulting in the overall argument and admission by the EC that regulators 
have to be strengthened so as to ensure the stable regulatory framework 
that is required for this overall approach to work. Not to mention the 
fact that this beautiful conceptual system has not (yet) been implemented 
European-wide either.
•	 There is secondly the problem that there are significant inconsistencies 
between the European regulatory framework on the one hand and the 
national regulatory practices on the other. There is often little coherence 
between the infrastructure managers across Europe, as well as between 
the different national regulators, all adding to the insecurity for investors.
•	 There is thirdly the problem of intermodality: indeed, one may question 
whether a coherent, stable and strong regulatory framework in the railway 
sector even makes sense, considering that competition comes from the 
road. As everybody knows, there are huge incoherencies between the 
way the road is financed and the way railways are financed. Only an 
overarching financing or pricing policy (e.g., mobility pricing) across the 
transport modes will ultimately create the security needed by the private 
investors into the railway sector.
In conclusion, one may ask whether it is advisable to first focus on the 
perfection of the model (unbundling, financing, regulation) or to open the 
black box of intermodality and to reconsider railway financing again in this 
new light (e.g., mobility pricing).
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Summary of the discussion at the Forum
The discussions during the 8th Florence Rail Forum 
addressed a wide range of arguments relating to 
investments in infrastructure and rolling stock. The 
first part focussed on infrastructure and the second one 
on rolling stock. In particular the discussion looked 
at how legislative initiatives impact on investment 
decisions in the two areas. The debate was structured 
around the four following questions.
Infrastructure: European and national 
regulation, which are the regulatory 
obstacles for more investments?
The discussion made quite clear that for many actors 
regulation as such is not perceived as an obstacle to 
investments. Instead, some of the most frequently 
mentioned barriers to investments were regulatory 
instability and lack of harmonisation. Moreover, some 
regulatory reforms aimed at encouraging innovation 
and investments at the European level were presented. 
The controversial discussion on this will be presented 
in this section.
It was pointed out that, in spite of the complexity of 
factors influencing investments, the sources of finance 
remain limited to user charges and tax-money; 
therefore any increase in investment needs to be 
accompanied by an increase in revenues from either 
of these sources.
A central problem that was identified in the discussion 
is the short term nature of politically motivated 
investment planning vis-à-vis the long term nature of 
rolling stocks and infrastructure. This can be overcome 
if governments are “forced” to have a more long term 
strategy and to provide the necessary means to ensure 
future maintenance and renewal of the infrastructure. 
In order to address this problem the Recast of the First 
Railway Package foresees compulsory development 
plans (Art. 30(2)) that are fixed in the form of contracts 
between governments and Infrastructure Managers 
with a minimum duration of five years. These plans 
have to define the allocation of funds for maintenance 
and renewal, how maintenance and renewal backlogs 
are to be dealt with and which new infrastructure 
is planned. In the discussion it was pointed out that 
contracts with an even much longer duration would 
be required to realistically reflect the very long term 
nature of rail infrastructure investments. Nevertheless 
these five years are already considered an achievement, 
given the strong political resistance of member states 
to binding rules on issues linked to public expenditure. 
Governments’ reluctance to agree on rules that limit 
their spending autonomy points to the general 
problem with funding of rail infrastructure: as was 
also mentioned during the debate the decision over 
the spending of (future) tax revenue is the prerogative 
of national parliaments. Therefore, as long as there is 
a high percentage of public money in the rail sector a 
certain “politicisation” of its spending is unavoidable. 
From an EU policy perspective it was however 
countered that the Commission, rather than 
controlling national spending, aims at creating a 
link between governments and the infrastructure 
managers in order to make planning more sustainable. 
Many problems with rail infrastructure investments in 
Europe were the result of a lack of accountability of 
governments in terms of their spending commitments 
for maintenance and renewal of infrastructure. It 
was said that, in some countries, no realistic business 
plans were drafted when new infrastructures had been 
built. Therefore, it was not possible to maintain and 
sustainably run the network that was initially offered. 
To improve the performance of infrastructure 
managers another Commission proposal foresees 
the establishment of a European Rail Infrastructure 
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Market liberalization, third party access 
regulation and the proper incentives for 
railroad investments
The long-lasting process of market opening on the EU railway 
markets abolishing all legal entry barriers is converging into its 
final round. The basic philosophy of third party access policies 
is that the owner of an infrastructure is obliged to provide 
non-discriminatory access to competitors on the (downstream) 
service markets. The term (mandatory) third party access only 
makes sense in the context of vertically integrated industries. 
In the context of the 4th Railway Package proposed by the 
European Commission on January 1, 2013 a proposal for 
amending Directive 2012/34/EU has been provided aiming to 
strengthen ex ante third party access regulation. In particular, 
an integrated railroad company must not have control over the 
decision making of the infrastructure manager. 
From essential facility doctrine towards 
theory of monopolistic bottlenecks
The concept of third party access continues pursuing to 
balance the trade-off between property rights and competition 
on the track. The essential facilities doctrine has its origins in 
US antitrust law. In accordance with this doctrine, a facility can 
only be regarded as essential if the following two conditions 
are fulfilled: (1) market entry to the complementary market 
is not actually possible without access to this facility, and 
(2) providers in the complementary market cannot, using 
reasonable effort, duplicate the facility; substitutes do not exist 
either. Case-by-case identification of essential facilities by 
court judgments does not guarantee a consistent localization 
of market power in liberalized network industries. The proper 
design of ex ante regulation requires generalizing the concept 
of the essential facilities doctrine to a class of facilities with the 
characteristics of a monopolistic bottleneck. The conditions 
governing a monopolistic bottleneck are met when a natural 
monopoly exists and a single provider is able to make the 
facility available more cheaply than several providers; and at 
the same time the facility cannot reasonably be duplicated as 
a way of controlling the active provider, in other words when 
there is no potential substitute. This is the case when the costs 
of the facility are irreversible.  
The danger of overregulation
According to the proposed Article 7c amending Directive 
2012/34/EU  the Commission would gain the competency 
to decide whether providers of train services belonging to 
vertically integrated railway companies are allowed to become 
active (on a home market or a foreign market). Even the 
fulfillment of access regulations in the proposed Articles 7a 
and 7b would not necessarily guarantee the right to enter the 
markets for train services. The problem of enforcement of third 
party access regulation is thereby mixed with ad hoc evaluations 
of the Commission whether a level playing field on the relevant 
markets of train services can be observed. Such a regulation 
would be completely anti-competitive and not compatible with 
the disaggregated approach of regulatory economics. It would 
be a combination of two failures: misunderstanding the many 
faces of competition on the markets for network services and 
mistrust of the proper application of the instruments of third 
party access regulations.
The compatibility of cabotage and third party 
access
Since market opening will not be finished until train 
companies in Europe do have free entry to the markets for 
domestic passenger train services throughout Europe, the issue 
of cabotage remains topical. Thus, cabotage is no longer per 
se forbidden. However, such a market entry and in particular 
cabotage must not conflict with public service contracts. The 
question arises whether there is an unsolvable conflict between 
cabotage and the provision of public services.
In order to strengthen competition on the international 
and national long distance markets for train services it is 
necessary to allow all forms of competition on the track and 
simultaneously raise an entry tax in order to compensate the 
holder of the exclusive right for providing subsidized train 
services. Subsequently the stated conflict between competition 
on the track and competitive tendering with exclusive rights to 
provide subsidized train services would disappear. 
Competition and Third Party Access in 
European Railroads 
GÜNTER KNIEPS | Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany
6 ■  FSR Transport ■ Issue 2014/03 ■ May 2014
Managers Platform. This platform should help to 
disseminate best practices and to increase the pressure 
for taking into account better the requirements of the 
infrastructure. This proposal was considered helpful 
by many participants because it aims at redefining the 
role of the infrastructure manager.
How this role should evolve was discussed from 
different perspectives, leading to the conclusion that a 
more holistic approach to network management was 
needed. The scope of the tasks of the infrastructure 
manager should not only entail track allocations 
and charging, but also strategy, operations, long-
term planning, maintenance and modernisation. 
In the Commission’s approach the infrastructure 
manager shall adopt a business plan, which includes 
investments and ensures optimal use and development 
of the infrastructure.
The issue of track access charges was discussed 
controversially on several points. As a general rule, 
infrastructure managers may charge direct costs that 
can be raised by several mark-ups. In order to stimulate 
market entry in some segments where there is little or 
no competition operators may only be charged with 
the direct costs. The question was raised whether this 
approach creates a disincentive: since a new market 
entrant faces low track access charges and knows that 
mark-ups can be increased later on once he becomes 
more profitable, he might not have the incentive to 
actually increase its efficiency. It was however also 
pointed out that this effect is mitigated by the fact that 
mark-ups are oriented at the average profitability of a 
narrowly defined market segment, and are not defined 
on a case-by-case basis.
Another element that was stressed in the debate 
was the need to focus investments on international 
corridors and specifically on links. It was however 
also pointed out that answering the question “who 
will get the money” on the European level can be a 
problematic issue as investments have a distributional 
effect as well and may not in all cases exclusively follow 
the logic of facilitating the best possible connections. 
For the freight sector the argument was made that 
improving the network and building links would 
be more important than focussing on competition 
enforcement. For the freight sector more than for 
passenger transport, the quality of the network and 
better connections, in particular to the big ports, are 
essential. The shift2rail initiative was praised by many 
especially because it focusses on the connection with 
businesses and is the sort of effort that is needed to 
make planning more efficient as it incorporates the 
operators into the planning process.
On a more general note it was pointed out that, while on 
many issues there was agreement about the desirability 
of outcomes (more investments in rail), some 
underlying conflicts remain unresolved: for instance, 
how can the welfare improving effects of flexible 
tariff structures be combined with the imperative to 
increase revenues and to increase investments? Some 
rail companies feel that they simultaneously should 
charge less and invest more. Another conflict pertains 
to the use of tax money and the question on how to 
allow the necessary parliamentary oversight over the 
spending of public money without interfering with 
business decisions of a rail company?
From the Commission’s perspective these problems 
are solvable when looking at the long term strategy: 
currently there can be no direct correspondence 
between revenue and expenditure in the rail sector 
as it is not a profit making business. Therefore the 
focus lays on maximising the long term revenues of 
the rail sector by increasing the revenue base, i.e., by 
generating more passengers and more freight on rail. 
To achieve this goal it would be justifiable, for example, 
to keep track access charges low in order to get more 
competitors onto the tracks and to maximize utilisation 
of the network. This will pay out at a later stage when 
rail enterprises will eventually become profitable and 
hence state subsidies could be reduced.
A somewhat different perspective was voiced in terms 
of the overall philosophy in the rail sector: what is 
needed is a stronger focus on innovation. As some 
examples have shown, the drive for a more efficient 
rail sector comes from the demand side. A certain 
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habit of the sector to rely on or ask for more public 
funding could impede a more business-oriented and 
innovative approach.
Infrastructure. How to overcome the 
investment gap? Best practices and possible 
solutions?
During the second session some existing and proposed 
regulatory measures aimed at overcoming the lack of 
investment in rail infrastructure at the European level 
have been discussed from different angles. Furthermore 
several examples of the concrete experience of rail 
operators and infrastructure managers in this field 
have been presented. 
Long term infrastructure planning and 
independent regulators: the UK as an 
example?  
The United Kingdom appeared to be a particular case 
that was referred to on various occasions and served as 
a benchmark for different issues. Most importantly, the 
level of rail investments in the UK is currently higher 
than it had been for most of the country’s history. 
Consequently, ‘bridging the investment gap’ is not 
precisely the challenge the UK is facing at the moment. 
Nevertheless, the issue of investment backlogs and the 
need for large scale renewals remains an issue both in 
the UK and in the rest of Europe. 
The British case was also interesting as it represents 
a unique model of separation of tasks and allocation 
of responsibilities between railway operator(s), 
infrastructure manager (Network Rail) and the 
regulatory agency (Office of Rail Regulator). Much 
in line with the European Commission’s vision, 
this model aims at linking government and the 
infrastructure manager. The regulator is in a powerful 
position and can act as an arbitrator between the 
demands of the government and the ability of the 
network manager to deliver on these. The regulator 
can ultimately force the government to either allocate 
more money for maintenance and renewal or to 
reduce foreseen outputs. On the other hand, it can also 
evaluate whether the infrastructure manager is making 
efficient use of its funds and appropriate planning for 
the development of the network.
There were different opinions as to how much 
competence the regulator should have. It was 
mentioned that the Commission had been advocating 
a strong regulator like in Britain for the entire EU, but 
member states were strongly opposed and would not 
even allow regulators to be entitled to give an opinion 
on the government plans. 
Another element on which different opinions where 
formulated was whether or not the infrastructure 
manager should have the possibility of making debt. 
Network Rail has partly been financing its investments 
by taking loans and currently uses 1/3 of its funding 
for debt financing. The European regulations do not 
allow debt financing of infrastructure by the network 
manager with refundable bank loans. According to 
the Recast, accounts of the infrastructure manager 
have to be balanced at least over a period of five years. 
Nevertheless, some elements allowing the use of 
private funds for rail infrastructure investments were 
introduced in the Recast.
National financing of railroads: sustainability 
of investments and capacity problems  
Some of the problems related to state investments in 
infrastructure became apparent in the German case. On 
the one hand, there is a clear division of tasks between 
the government and the integrated rail company 
Deutsche Bahn (DB). Infrastructure investments (new 
and upgrading projects) are financed by the federal 
government, and operations as well as maintenance 
are financed by DB, while DB also co-finances part of 
the investments in the infrastructure. A problem arises 
when the government “does not fulfil its promises” 
in terms of its foreseen investments. Over the recent 
years, DB has had to increase its share of infrastructure 
financing in order to fill these investment gaps. 
The rules under which DB conducts infrastructure 
financing are however different from those of the State: 
the rule for DB to “act as a commercial enterprise” is of 
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constitutional rank in Germany. Therefore an increase 
in investments has to be balanced with an increase in 
revenues, and investments can only be done where 
they offer a sufficient return.
It was said that in many countries the process of 
determining infrastructure financing is done in a way 
that is not conducive to a sustainable management of the 
infrastructure. In many cases the process begins with, 
firstly, a certain amount of tax money being allocated. 
Secondly outputs being defined and thirdly leaving the 
amount needed that is not covered by the allocated 
tax money to be earned with track access charges. In 
principle, it should however be the other away round: 
first governments should define how many revenues 
are to be expected, then define which investments will 
be done and finally allocate the necessary funding.
In some cases this principle had to be enforced by 
means of legal procedures. According to the European 
Commission, a sustainable funding system cannot be 
achieved if revenues from track access charges annually 
depend on what a government is willing to spend. In 
some cases, the result may be that capacities have to be 
reduced, which makes sense when there is not enough 
money available for proper maintenance. On this 
point, it was however also stressed that the political 
difficulties for closing down rail tracks and stations 
should not be underestimated, therefore “reducing 
capacities” cannot easily be done in the rail sector.
It was furthermore questioned whether solving 
the capacity problem would need an amount of 
cooperation that would be in conflict with the strict 
approach to network governance that is followed by 
the European Commission and which foresees a strict 
separation of network and service provision. There was 
agreement that addressing these issues is becoming 
more urgent with increasing transport volumes and 
that investments need to be focussed primarily on 
bottlenecks and links.
European financiang for enhancing 
(passenger and freight) rail competitiveness
In the debate it was also pointed out that rail freight 
and passenger transport in spite of mostly being a 
monopoly not all economic principles related to this 
apply. This is because they are substitutable by road 
transport. Economic regulation has also to make sure 
that rail becomes more competitive in comparison to 
road transport.
The TEN-T and CEF initiative were praised as a good 
way to invest in pan-European connections. However, 
criticism related to the planning of investments was 
voiced. Concretely, a project was mentioned where 
in spite of an investment volume of over 100 million 
euro for the rebuilding of a bridge between Bulgaria 
and Romania, no actual cost reduction for the freight 
operator using the track was achieved. In this case 
investments should have focussed more on the 
electrification of feeder lines to the bridge because 
without those the additional costs of using the bridge 
are higher than those of using the longer, traditional 
connection.
To address this and similar other problems, a better 
coordination with the industry and the operators was 
called for, in particular with regard to freight.
Rolling-stock. Are there alternative 
approaches to investments in rolling stock? 
In spite of operating under a business approach, railway 
undertakings are still special and different from other 
business in many aspects. This relates partly to the 
characteristic of rolling stock as an “asset”.
Rolling stock as a liquid asset?  
Compared to airplanes, railways are lagging behind 
in terms of international harmonization of technical 
and safety standards as well as interoperability. This 
has an impact on the “liquidity” of rolling stock as 
an asset. It was pointed out that in aviation, with the 
help of EASA, achievements in terms of technical 
harmonization have been made that could serve as 
an example for the rail sector. As international traffic 
is growing and rail companies operate in different 
markets, interoperability becomes more and more 
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important. Rolling stock can become a more liquid 
asset if regulation is harmonized across Europe. 
There have been numerous efforts in the EU for 
harmonization and standardization over the past 
twenty years, leading to the current proposed 4th 
Railway Package. However many challenges remain 
for achieving the needed degree of harmonization 
(see also the workshop papers of the 6th Florence Rail 
Forum: the technical pillar of the 4th Railway Package).
How to facilitate investments? 
If there was better harmonization and coordination, 
more investors could be interested in the EU rolling 
stock market. This claim was put forward especially 
after having looked at the Japanese case, where the 
operators are fully private, no government procurement 
rules apply and where the process of vehicle validation 
is much more linear than in most of the European 
countries.  
Another effort to attract private investments is the 
Luxembourg protocol which is currently seeking 
ratification by the European Union member states 
(see Giulia Mauri’s contribution). This protocol aims 
at establishing a global system for recognition and 
registration of security interests in rolling stock. This 
would reduce risks and costs for private investors 
financing rolling stock. 
Rolling-stock. How does current and 
planned European regulation influence 
asset renewal, investment and innovation in 
rolling stock? 
Clearly, regulation has a substantial impact on 
investments in rolling stock. In the discussion 
particular attention was paid to how PSO-contracts 
and tendering relate to investments in rolling stock.
PSO contracts and tendering procedures
Despite the fact that tendering of PSO-contracts has 
become the norm in many EU countries, rules on how 
the tendering procedures shall be conducted often still 
have deficits. One part of this discussion focused on 
how regulation of PSO-contracts and tendering relate 
to investments, as an uncertain regulatory framework 
can hamper long term investments. This was illustrated 
for example on the Italian case where many tendering 
procedures will not be completed before the new 
contract period is due to start, yet rules on how the 
transitional period should be governed are not in place.
However, from the Commission’s perspective the 
implementation of functioning tendering procedures 
is the only possible solution because it would bring 
transparency and clarify the relationship between the 
contracting authority and the operator. 
A discrepancy was noted in terms of the timing of 
investments and the length of contracts. Rolling stock 
can usually run for up to 30 years, and investment in 
new rolling stock typically requires a contract period of 
12-15 years to be cost-effective, however concessions 
last on average only six years. It was therefore called 
for some regulatory harmonisation that would allow 
operators to either cascade rolling stock to the new 
winner of the concession or to the client body, or 
that rolling stock can be moved to a different location 
where the owner of the rolling stock operates. 
The absence of such regulation can prevent 
competition because possible market entrants are 
unable to get bank loans for rolling stock without a 
sufficiently secured revenue base.  The Commission 
proposes to tackle this problem by giving the public 
authorities the possibility to provide guarantees and 
make the rolling stock available to the subsequent 
contractor. Another possible way of tackling the issue 
is a functioning second hand market for rolling stock. 
An impediment for this is the fact that operators 
prefer scrapping wagons instead of selling them to 
competitors. Nevertheless, harmonisation of technical 
requirements would help to establish a functioning 
second-hand market for rolling stock.
A downside of giving authority over all aspects of the 
tendering process to the regional transport authority 
is that it leads to the problem of different technical 
requirements in every region, which again impedes a 
second-hand market for rolling stock. Furthermore, 
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Rail operators with an international exposure and activity 
know that buying or leasing rolling stock is a choice that it is 
only partially their own. 
In Europe different models for the provision and ownership of 
rolling stock co-exist. Indeed, the rolling stock may be leased 
from a ROSCO (rolling stock operating company), it may be 
provided by the operator or the operator may be obliged, under 
the relevant tender documentation, to buy the existing rolling 
stock at a pre-agreed value or to lease it from the relevant public 
body. More often than not, the choice of the model applied to 
the relevant transaction is left to the concerned public body. 
The financing of rolling stock is nowadays achieved through 
different models that favour public spending in certain 
countries and encourage private funds to enter the market in 
other countries. 
Presently, there is no general framework for taking security 
over financed rolling stock and the entry of private capital in 
this market is still quite low. A major barrier to entry of private 
capital is certainly the limited “liquidity” of the financed asset. 
Indeed, increased standardization and interoperability will 
certainly help private lenders and lessors of rolling stock to be 
able to re-sale or re-lease the same asset in different countries. 
Another major obstacle to more private financing of rolling 
stock is linked to fragmented and obscure national regulations. 
There is a general acknowledgement that a lack of harmonization 
and a lack of transparency in relation to the legal framework 
applicable to security on rolling stock lead to a lack of private 
funds invested in this sector. 
Indeed, private sector funders require that the credit that they 
provide, under the form of loans or leases, will be repaid and 
that their property rights or security rights will be respected 
even when their collateral (i.e. the relevant rolling stock) 
moves across borders or even if it remains in the state where 
it was originally funded. The main problem is that there is 
no international registry system for the security interests of 
financiers on the relevant rolling stock and therefore the risk in 
financing such an asset remains high. This translates into high 
rates of lending. 
The Unidroit Convention on International Interests on Mobile 
Equipment provides an answer to financiers and operators alike 
by introducing much needed uniformity and transparency in 
relation to security over rolling stock. 
The Convention, as applied to rolling stock, was approved 
at a Diplomatic Conference in Luxembourg in February 
2007, sponsored by OTIF (Intergovernmental Organisation 
for International Carriage by Rail) and by Unidroit. The 
Convention provides for an international system of recognition 
and registration of security interests in rolling stock, therefore 
protecting lenders’ and lessors’ interests in the assets that they 
finance. 
The Convention applies to rolling stock, broadly described so 
as to include also trams and high speed trains. An international 
electronic registry is created, which allows the registration of 
the interest of a lessor under a lease agreement, the interest of a 
bank or other financier taking security over the asset as part of 
a loan or another credit facility agreement.
The registry will be accessible 24/7 by any interested party 
facilitating prospective creditors checking any existing claim 
on the asset that they intend to finance. 
The Convention also creates a common system of repossession 
of rolling stock in case of default or insolvency of the 
debtor subject to specific safeguards such as public interest’s 
obligations. 
By reducing risk for rail equipment financiers, the Convention 
will attract more private funds into the market possibly 
resulting in cheaper finance for operators and will facilitate 
short term operating leases of rolling stock so as to introduce 
greater flexibility in the management of operators’ fleets. 
Moreover, it is also estimated that a more reliable system of 
security over the asset could encourage not just the development 
of a strong leasing market to railway operators from financiers 
but also between operators ensuring more efficient use of 
rolling stock. 
For the text of the Convention as well as helpful articles, notes 
and papers, please see “http://www.railworkinggroup.org” 
The Unidroit Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment as applied to 
Rolling Stocks: making financing of rolling 
stock attractive to private funds 
GIULIA MAURI | Brussels Representative of the Rail Working Group and Partner at Verhaegen Walravens
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there is often the political wish by the transport 
authorities to have new rolling stock. There was an 
agreement that a next step should therefore be an 
increase in harmonisation of train specifications.
In regional transport a variety of arrangements 
between public authorities, operators and rolling stock 
companies exist. For instance, maintenance can be 
the responsibility of the contractor in countries like 
Germany and the Netherlands, whereas in Sweden 
maintenance is under the responsibility of the transport 
authority and directly contracted. Different models for 
financing rolling stock were discussed as well.
Different opinions were formulated as to whether 
PSO-tendering can facilitate financing. From the 
different examples that were presented it emerged 
that there was a varying degree of competition for 
PSO-contracts which had an impact not only on the 
price for services but also on the cost of rolling stock. A 
study presented comparing average costs and delivery 
times of for electric multiple units (excluding double-
deck vehicles) in Germany and France showed that 
France paid on average 22.5% more per car and has a 
delivery time of over three years whereas in Germany 
it is two years. In Germany there are eight different 
operating companies on the purchasing side and four 
different rolling stock suppliers, whereas in France 
there is only one operating company and one supplier 
for this type of train.
On this point it was also discussed whether mandatory 
tendering of PSOs should have been kept in the 
European regulations as this was initially intended by 
the European Commission. The European Parliament 
had insisted on replacing the provision with mandatory 
performance parameters to bring down costs. For 
the advocates of tendering there was a clear case that 
market competition brings down prices automatically 
whereas performance parameters create additional 
bureaucratic costs with unclear benefits. 
Some limitations of open market tendering and those 
of the presented alternative models of financing and 
maintenance of rolling stock were also pointed out; first 
of all, the long term nature of the contracts leaves little 
room for actual competition. Another problem relates 
to take-back guarantees for rolling stock: if a take-back 
guarantee is provided the public transport authority 
is deprived of the possibility to renew the rolling for 
each contract. If there is however no guarantee, all the 
risks and costs are borne by the transport operating 
company which is the case for the German Länder. 
From the point of view of an incumbent operator, those 
models were in the first place a response to shrinking 
budgets of the public sector that only create short term 
savings but do not bring down costs in the long run. 
From this point of view decisions over maintenance 
and train specifications are best left with the train 
operating company that has sufficient knowledge and 
experience.
Costs of standardization in rail freight
An element that was brought forward was the cost 
aspect of European regulation on standards for freight 
trains on wagon keepers. A study that was presented 
in the discussion on the economic effects of four 
recent regulations on wagon standards showed that 
investments that would have to be made to comply 
with the regulations are quite substantial and range up 
to 68% of current costs. This is in particular related to 
retrofitting for noise standards. The Commission is in 
a difficult position on this issue, as for the majority of 
member states, the Netherlands and Germany being 
the only exceptions, noise reduction is not a priority 
and they would therefore not agree on making the 
higher and more costly requirements a standard for 
all of Europe. The Commission proposes to offer 
compensation to the investors by allowing a rebate on 
track access charges for retro-fitted wagons.
Another element was that intermodal competition 
has to be borne in mind when drafting legislation. In 
the case of safety regulation it was pointed out that 
necessary investments resulting from increased safety 
standards may result in increasing the cost for freight 
transport and thus shifting freight from rail to road. 
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Further readings
Florence School of Regulation Transport Area, 2014, 8th European Rail 
Transport Regulation Summary: Rail Infrastructure and Rolling Stock: 
investments, asset renewal and regulation
This document summarises the content of the presentations delivered 
during the 8th Florence Rail Forum, offering short summaries of each 
presentation, and illustrating the main points made and matters treated. 
Presentations were delivered by representatives of different types of 
stakeholders, who reacted to the same initial questions that have been 
addressed in the present Observer:
•	 Infrastructure. European and national regulation: which are 
the regulatory obstacles for more investment in infrastructure 
maintenance and modernisation?
•	 Infrastructure. How to overcome the investment gap? Best practices 
and possible solutions?
•	 Rolling-stock. Are railway operators limited in their business 
approach? Did the shrinking public funding and the presence of 
new rail operators impact on innovation?
•	 Rolling-stock. How does current and planned European regulation 
influence asset renewal, investment and innovation in rolling-stock?
Messerlin Patrick, 2013, The Japan-EU Negotiations on Railway, Policy 
Brief No3/2014, Ecipe - European centre for international political 
economy
Despite major advancements in the Japan-EU FTA (JEUFTA) 
negotiations, the talks remain difficult in the railway sector. These 
difficulties flow largely from the fact that the Japanese railways are 
organized on a radically different legal and economic basis than the 
railway systems in the EU. First, the three major Japanese passenger rail 
companies, are totally privatized, listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
and do not receive pub- lic subsidies. Japanese firms are even “more 
private” than an US railway company such as Amtrak, funded by federal 
money. In the Japanese deregulation, the markets remained unbundled 
with passenger rail companies owning both trains and tracks.
Paolo Beria, Emile Quinet, Gines de Rus, Carola Schulze, 2012, A 
comparison of rail liberalisation levels across four European countries, 
Research in Transportation Economics, 36(1)
This paper presents the results of a research into railway regulation and 
liberalisation in Italy, France, Germany and Spain. The analysis covers 
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the relationship between the State and the rail companies, network 
access conditions by operators, slot allocating and pricing schemes and 
how public service obligations are defined, financed and regulated.
The aim of the paper is to give a comparative overview of the regulation 
of railways. The regulatory frameworks are described and then assessed 
according to their implications on the degree of liberalisation and on 
their actual market opening.
The conclusions are that the actual level of market opening is still 
limited and, only in some cases, is the liberalisation improving. Entry in 
the industry has not yet developed its full potential. An issue emerging 
in this research is the opposing attitude of incumbent railways against 
liberalisation and the role of governments in backing this behaviour.
Yves Crozet, Florian Chassagne, 2013, Rail access charges in France: 
Beyond the opposition between competition and financing, Research in 
Transportation Economics, 39(1)
Access charges to the railway infrastructures, and in particular of 
the high speed lines, poses many theoretical and practical questions. 
Besides the need to decide whether it is better to apply a principle of 
marginal cost or a full cost approach, a difficulty arises with regard to 
the possibilities of competition between various operators. France is 
especially affected by this problem since access charges are particularly 
high while at the same time competition is non-existent. Is this absence 
of competition explained by the high level of access charges? After 
describing the principles which underlie the pricing scheme for high 
speed trains in France, this paper attempts to find out if these tolls 
constitute a barrier to entry. After building a model that summarizes 
the components of supply and demand on the Paris–Lyon journey, this 
paper shows that the considerations relating to demand (peak hour or 
off-peak hour) are more fundamental than access charges, which do not 
in themselves constitute a barrier to entry. Barriers exist, but they involve 
access charges in relation to the allocation of slots which would make it 
possible to guarantee certain profitability to a new entrant. Break-even 
points are proposed which show that SNCF’s potential competitors have 
margins for manoeuvre. 
European Parliament Library Briefing, 2013, The Fourth Railway 
Package, 06/03/2013 
The 4th Railway Package is the next step towards the European 
Commission’s vision of a Single European Railway Area. The proposal 
was published in January 2013 and is currently under discussion by the 
Council of Ministers. The European Parliament Library offers a short 
summary and analysis of the most important measures of the Package.
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